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Introduction 
The international corporate collapse and accounting scandals surrounding some 
prominent world’s large companies (e.g. Enron, Xerox, World.com etc.) raised concern 
regarding the effectiveness of various monitoring mechanisms that protect investors’ interests. 
The majority of these failures resulted, in part, from accounting manipulations and disregard of 
efficient corporate governance mechanisms that control opportunistic behavior of management. 
Agency conflicts within a firm are considered to be among the most influential sources of 
earnings management activities (Richardson, 2000). Corporate governance mechanisms are 
designed to minimize divergences which arise from the separation of ownership and decision 
control. Corporate governance mechanisms furthermore guarantee that managers act in the 
interests of shareholders (Denis and McConnel, 2003).  
Boards of directors is an essential mechanism of corporate governance, as it is important 
to the accountability of corporations and the way corporations comply with modern ethical and 
economic standards. Strong and effective boards are valuable corporate assets. Board of directors 
is one of the greatest organizational innovations in the field of corporate governance.  
A number of studies have investigated the relationship between boards of directors and 
ownership structure with company’s earnings management. And most of these studies show that 
this relationship is strong. However, the vast majority of the studies have been conducted on the 
companies from the developed, emerging economies and transition economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Yet, still little is known about the influence of different corporate governance 
mechanisms on earnings management in transition economies of Central Asia. The development 
of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms in transition economies needs to be 
distinguished from the economies of the West for instance, as in these economies there was 
initial complete absence of the necessary prerequisites of an appropriate legal infrastructure and 
financial institutions in an environment where incumbent management and employees have 
entrenched rights within enterprises (Wright, Buck and Filatotchev, 2005). Legislation had to be 
enacted which for the first time introduced Western-style property rights and financial reporting 
requirements (Wright, Buck and Filatotchev, 2005). The process of forming themselves as a 
truly autonomous state was the principal direction of the Central Asian countries. Central Asian 
region is strategically significant to the world economy due to its location and hydrocarbon 
resources. Central Asia is a hub between Asia and Europe; hence it is politically important to 
keep Central Asia autonomous to prevent any power gaining dominance in Eurasia (Denoon, 
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2016). Secondly, the region’s crucial assets are its hydrocarbon resources (Denoon, 2016).  As 
such, Kazakhstan is the largest and most oil rich country in Central Asia, bordering Russia and 
China with a territory larger than the whole of Western Europe but with roughly the same 
population as the Netherlands (Denoon, 2016).   
Establishment of good corporate governance practices has become an important task for 
Central Asian countries and Kazakhstan particularly for several reasons. Firstly, Kazakhstan is 
transforming from state and centralized economy to a private sector centered economy. 
Secondly, privatization was taking a very rapid and important role in establishing private 
ownership.  Thirdly, in January 2018 Kazakhstan has officially launched Astana International 
Financial Centre (AIFC) with an ambitious plan to become the financial hub for Central Asia, 
the Caucasus, Eurasian Economic Union, the Middle East, West China, Mongolia and Europe. 
The new financial center plans to attract USD 40 billion of investments by 2025 and ensure 
about 1% growth in the carbonless GDP of Kazakhstan. One of the key factors of AIFC is the 
presence of a separate legal and regulatory system based on the principles of the British 
Common Law, according to which the Financial Court and Arbitration Centre started their 
operations in 2018. These measures aim to ensure the justice of the operations and to improve 
the credibility of Kazakhstan in the eyes of the investors. Hence, Kazakhstani companies 
planning to receive financing through AIFC should pay highest attention to implementation of 
efficient corporate governance practices and improving the quality of earnings.  
There are limited number of research papers which look at the existence of association 
between overall corporate governance and earnings management of Kazakhstan. Two surveys 
were conducted by international financial institutions: IFC and EBRD. Survey of IFC focused on 
the description of general corporate governance practices of Kazakhstani firms. While EBRD’s 
survey focused on the descriptive assessment of the board structure alone with a small sample of 
10 companies. Research by Baimukhamedova et al. (2015) was conducted to reveal the effect of 
overall corporate governance on earnings management in Kazakhstani companies operating in 
natural resource sector only. However, these studies and assessments do not provide the insight 
on how the specific mechanisms of corporate governance influence the earnings management. 
Existing researches do not provide the information about the structure of board of directors and 
ownership to learn how the optimal “team” should be formed in order to achieve the highest 
results in business and provide trustworthy information to the stakeholders.  
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 The research gap that arises from the review of the literature is a lack of understanding 
of the influence of specific corporate governance mechanisms such as board of directors and 
ownership structure on the earnings management in Kazakhstani companies.  
This research fills the gap by studying the nature of relationship of specific mechanisms 
of corporate governance such as board of directors and ownership structure on the earnings 
management of Kazakhstan’s listed companies.  
Research goal 
The goal of the research is to establish the relationship between the board of directors 
characteristics and ownership structure with the earnings management of companies listed at 
Kazakhstan Stock Exchange.  
Research objectives 
The following objectives were set to achieve this goal: 
1) to identify  the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings 
management in a company;  
2) to review the state of corporate governance in Kazakhstan;  
3) to choose the model to measure earnings management;  
4) to run multiple regression analysis to establish the relationship between board of directors 
characteristics and ownership structure with earnings management of Kazakhstani listed 
companies;  
5) to interpret the results and formulate conclusions. 
The object of the research are companies listed at Kazakhstan Stock Exchange for the 
period from 2010-2016. The subject of the research is the relationship between board of 
directors characteristics, ownership structure and earnings management of studied companies. 
Research questions 
o What is the structure of the board of directors of Kazakhstani listed companies? 
o Does board structure (size, independence, gender diversity and age diversity) of Kazakhstani 
listed companies have a relationship with the earnings management?  
o What is the ownership structure of Kazakhstani listed companies? 
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o Does ownership structure of Kazakhstani listed companies have a relationship with the earnings 
management?  
Thesis structure 
The first chapter presents theoretical foundations of relationship between board of 
directors, ownership structure and earnings management. Current state of corporate governance 
in Kazakhstan is also reviewed. The second chapter presents research methodology, data 
description and research findings. Finally, interpretation of the results is presented and 
managerial applications are formulated. 
Value of the research 
The research results will be useful for local and foreign investors, mainly for making 
investment decisions. The study will also improve understanding of how corporate governance 
mechanisms affect earnings management. The results of the study will also be useful for 
shareholders of different companies to assess the importance of implementing sound corporate 
governance practices in order to maximize shareholder wealth. The results of the study will also 
be useful in developing guidelines for promoting policies to support sound corporate governance. 
The study also serves to add a contribution to the theory. The research will help to understand 
the importance of the agency theory among other theories, the application of the theory and its 
connection with the research results. Researchers interested in the field of corporate governance 
can use the results of the study for further research 
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Chapter 1. Theoretical Underpinnings of Relationship between 
Board of Directors, Ownership Structure and 
Earnings Management 
An important part of the firm’s annual reports are earnings. Earnings reveal what value 
added has been made in a given year. Having an understanding that earnings are crucial 
managers are inclined to show good financial indicators to the various stakeholders. To do so, 
managers can manipulate accounting figures in the financial reports by applying flexibility given 
by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Such practices are known as earnings 
management. It is a practice used by managers to reach the target that was predetermined.  
According to Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008), poor accounting quality encourages the 
management to indulge into earnings management practices. As noted by Alves (2012), the 
interests of managers and shareholders are not aligned due to agency problem and information 
asymmetry. Hence, managers are inclined to maximize their utility by opportunistically 
managing the earnings. 
According to Dechow (1996), accounting earnings are more trustworthy and informative 
when the opportunistic behavior of managers is controlled by different monitoring systems. As 
noted by Garcia-Meca and P. Sanchez-Ballesta (2009), after several recent financial scandals 
(Enron, Xerox, Worldcom), there has been a trend worldwide to develop and implement 
corporate governance mechanisms to tackle the opportunistic behavior which has weakened 
investors’ reliability in financial information provided. Corporate governance mechanisms aid 
investors by aligning interests of managers with shareholders’ interests and by improving the 
credibility of financial information. 
1.1. Concept of Earnings Management 
According to Mangala and Isha (2017), earnings management is a transformation of 
accounting numbers to fulfill the predetermined managerial motives by taking the advantage of 
existing rules and regulations. Earnings management takes place when the managers use the 
judgement in preparing financial statements and can structure transactions in way that modify 
financial statements, which misleads stakeholders about the company’s true economic situation 
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999).  
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There are two techniques that can be used by executives to manage earnings: accrual 
earnings management and real earnings management. According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), in 
accrual based earnings management, manager can change the level of accruals to achieve the 
desired level of earnings through their own judgement in financial reporting. For instance, these 
could be provisions for doubtful accounts, provisions for obsolete inventories and variation in 
the useful economic life of depreciated long-term assets. In real earnings management, manager 
could alter the operating decisions so that to structure the transactions. According to 
Roychowdhury (2006), for example to reduce discretionary expenses as R&D expenditures, 
overproducing to report lower cost of goods, to offer price discounts to temporarily increase sale.  
However, there needs to be an understanding of the difference between earnings 
management and an accounting fraud. So, earnings management implies earnings manipulation 
through applying the discretion allowed by accounting standards and/or structuring the 
transaction in such a way, so that the firm value is not negatively affected. According to Dechow 
and Skinner (2000), earnings management can be categorized into three parts: conservative 
accounting, neutral accounting and aggressive accounting.  
 While fraudulent accounting implies earnings manipulation through violation of 
accounting standards and/or structuring the transactions in such a way as to decrease expected 
value of the firm. According to Yaping (2005), if put in other words, when earnings 
manipulation is within limits of GAAP it is earnings management and when the limits are 
violated it is considered fraud. 
 Popular earnings management methods used by the companies to manipulate earnings 
are:  aggressive revenue recognition, aggressive capitalization, accounting choice method, 
misrepresenting cash flows, big bath accounting and cookie jars reserve etc. Accrual accounting 
plays a crucial role in earnings management.   According to Gakhar (2013), accrual accounting, 
in comparison with cash system, offers many opportunities to executives to define company’s 
earnings in accordance with their preference.  Accounting earnings of a company consists of 
cash from operations and total accruals (Mangala D and Isha, 2017). Total accruals consist of 
discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals in their nature are 
not obligatory and are based on the manger’s discretion, while non-discretionary accruals are 
obligatory, as they result from normal operations of business or accounting transactions in the 
past. Subsequently, discretionary accruals are used as an earnings management mechanism and 
are used as a measure of earnings management. 
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1.2. Motives for Earnings Management 
Empirical data suggests different explanations for earnings management, such as stock 
market motives, signaling/concealing private information, political cost, personal interest, 
internal motives, management compensation motives, lending contracts and regulatory motives. 
These motives can be divided into four main categories: capital market, management 
compensation contracts, external contracts, regulatory and political cost motives (Mangala and 
Isha, 2017). 
Capital market motives 
Managers used earnings management techniques to influence accounting information in 
reports to achieve the goal of improving short-term stock price performance. This is due to the 
fact that share prices are sensitive to the benchmarks of earnings that help investors assess the 
company's position in the market.  According to Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a), IPO firms are 
involved in income increasing earnings management activities than non-IPO firms, and then 
showed poor earnings and stock performance in subsequent years.  Teoh, Welch & Wong 
(1998b), conclude further that companies increase their earnings around seasoned equity 
offerings to increase the value of share in the capital market and reduce earnings in subsequent 
years due to the reversal of discretionary accruals. According to Mangala D and Isha (2017), 
another motive for companies to apply earnings management is to meet the expectations of stock 
market analysts. The reason is that investors often make decisions based on the expectations of 
stock market analysts. 
Management compensation contract motives 
According to Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995), managers engage in accrual 
manipulation to manage earnings up or down to maximize their compensation as their bonuses 
are tied to the company's earnings. Thus, when the level of earnings reaches the cap on bonus 
awards, managers apply income decreasing earnings management methods. They can also defer 
earnings in the current period to the next period, as after that no additional bonus is paid. 
Conversely, when earnings are below the minimum required to receive a bonus, managers apply 
income increasing earnings management techniques. 
External contracts motives 
Debt contracts, supplying contracts, covenants, dividend covenants, etc. are the types of 
external contracts. In order to regulate the company's activities, creditors may set certain 
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financial limits, for example, to maintain a certain level of reported accounting indicators and 
ratios, so that creditors can be confident about the repayment of the company's debt. Thus, 
companies with a high level of debt in the capital structure are motivated to change the 
accounting indicators through the application of earnings management practices. This is done 
with an aim to follow the covenants specified by the creditors (Mangala and Isha, 2017). 
Regulatory and Political Costs Motives 
This set of motives applies to industries such as banking, insurance, utilities. These 
industries are closely monitored on the basis of the regulations in terms of accounting indicators 
and ratios, which would confirm that companies are compliant with specific industry and 
antitrust regulations. Thus, banks that are close to the minimum capital requirements are 
motivated to apply income increasing earnings management practices to avoid the breach of 
regulations. In case of failure to comply with the requirements, restrictions on dividend and 
management dismissal regulatory interventions are imposed. With political cost motivations, 
companies adjust the financial figures with an aim of reducing political costs and taxation. 
According to Noronha, Zeng & Vinten (2008), private firms apply earnings management 
practices with the goal of saving tax expenditures.  
The figure below summarizes the drivers and motives for managers to manipulate 
earnings in the light of the different conditions that lead to earnings management, creative 
accounting and fraudulent accounting practices. 
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Fig. 1 Conceptual framework of earnings management
1
 
1.3. Board of Directors 
The main purpose of corporate governance practices is to decrease agency issues, as 
opportunistic earnings management evolves around agency issues. Following are the main 
mechanisms of corporate governance: characteristics of a board, characteristics of audit 
committees and ownership structures. 
This paper will focus on the influence of board of directors and ownership structure as 
part of corporate governance mechanisms on the earnings management practices. According to 
Dechow et al. (1996), whenever the corporate governance quality is low, the chances of 
engaging in opportunistic earnings management are high. 
According to Jensen (Jensen, 1993), one of the main goals of the board of directors is 
associated with the replacement of the current leadership in the event of poor corporate 
performance, therefore, as a rule, the work of the board of directors is concerned with hiring, 
dismissing and compensating the Chief Executive Officer.  Hart (1995) formulated a theoretical 
criterion that can be used to evaluate alternative governance mechanisms. Hart (1995) described 
two main conditions under which corporate governance mechanisms are crucial.  First, an 
                                               
1
 Mangala D. and Isha G. (2017). A brief mapping of earnings management’s drivers and restraints. Journal of 
Commerce and Accounting Research, vol.6, issue 3, pp. 19-28. 
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agency problem (in other words, a conflict of interest) must exist between members of an 
organization (such as between owners, managers, consumers, or suppliers). Second, the cost of 
the transaction should be prohibitive such that the problem cannot be solved under the well-
specified contract (implying that complete contracts which specify all current and future 
contingencies cannot be written) (Hart, 1995). Even though the link between executive 
compensation and company performance is weak, there are other mechanisms to ensure 
consistency between agents and principals. One such mechanism is the board of directors. As 
Jensen (1993) noted: “the board, at the apex of the internal control system, has the final 
responsibility for the functioning of the firm". Therefore, there is an opinion that active 
monitoring of top management can improve decision making and, as such, corporate 
performance.   
The literature highlights two main roles and functions of the board of directors in 
corporate affairs: the board of directors as a monitor and management advisor and the board of 
directors as an adversary of management.  The first model covers a wide range of opportunities; 
on the one hand, the board will limit itself to assessing the effectiveness of management against 
established goals and discharging managers who have not achieved those goals. And on the other 
hand, the board will decide whether to accept the proposals made by the management in respect 
to important policies and objectives of the corporation. Between these two ends, there is a view 
that the boards will vary the comprehensiveness of their review and of their participation in 
decisions. 
Board of directors diversity 
One of the most important factors on corporate governance is supposed to be board of 
directors. According to Hambrick (1996), diversity is “the great number of different statuses 
among which a population is distributed”. Generally, there is a number of arguments in favor of 
diversity of board of members. In terms of the business case Carter (2003) identifies number of 
positive points for consideration. Carter (2003) also discusses the issue of managing diversity in 
the context of principal-agent problem. One of the points in favor of the diversity of the board of 
directors is that a more diverse board of directors can make decisions based on assessment of a 
wider range of choices compared to a more homogeneous board of directors. It is assumed that a 
diverse board of directors has a better understanding of the company’s market, and 
hypothetically diversity impacts growth in creativity and innovation. Diversity of the board can 
also improve the image of the company, which in turn can have positive effects on the 
customers. Additionally, when the candidates for the board of directors are chosen among the 
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best from the pool of both male and females, the quality will be much higher than if only men 
are potential candidates (Smith et al. 2005). 
Nevertheless, there can also be arguments against diversity (Smith et al. 2005). If a more 
diverse board of directors produces more opinions and more critical questions, this might be 
more time consuming and thus not as effective as a more homogeneous board of directors. This 
is especially true if a company operates in a highly competitive environment where the ability to 
quickly react to market shocks is an important issue. Hambrick (1996) noted that a board which 
is culturally, ethically and gender diverse can face more struggles, and even though decisions 
may ultimately be better, this may not offset the undesirable consequences of a slower decision-
making process if the market area of the company calls for swift reactions. 
The board of directors can be used as a tool for dealing with problems of external 
interdependence and uncertainty, resulting from its exchange of resources with important 
external organizations. In organizations where the board of directors deviates from an optimal or 
preferred structure have a tendency to be less profitable, controlling for industry effects than 
those which do not deviate as much, this is an instruments with which to deal with the 
environment and if organizations fail to use this instrument accordingly, they would suffer from 
reduced profits  
 Numbers of studies have researched heterogeneity in groups and they showed that 
diversity could offer both a great opportunity for organizations as well as pose a big challenge.  
On one hand, some studies show that more varied groups are able to take into account wider 
range of viewpoints and generate higher quality results than less varied groups. From another 
perspective, the greater amount of diversity in a group or an organizational subunit, the less 
integrated the group is likely to be and hence the higher is the level of dissatisfaction and 
turnover. Therefore, diversity could increase the opportunity for creativity as well as the 
likelihood that group members will be dissatisfied and fail to identify with the group. 
There are two major theoretical perspectives in the management and corporate 
governance literature which underlie the rationale for board diversity as shown in Table1. The 
first is agency theory, which can be briefly summarized as the board’s monitoring role in 
protecting shareholder interests from the self-interests of management. The second perspective 
relating to arguments in favor of diversity is the resource dependence view, which regards the 
board as an essential link between the organization and the key resources necessary to maximize 
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its performance. These theoretical frameworks highlight the role of the board in carrying out its 
governance function. 
Table 1 Two perspectives on Boards of Directors
2
 
Dimension Agency Theory perspective Resource Dependence perspective 
Board role The primary roles of boards is to 
monitor actions of agents 
(executives) to ensure their 
efficiency and to protect principals’ 
(owners’) interests 
1. Boards are a cooperative mechanism 
to extract resources vital to company 
performance 
2. Boards serve a boundary spanning 
roles 
3. Boards enhance organizational 
legitimacy 
4.  
Operational 
definition of 
boards’ role 
1. Maximizing shareholders’ wealth 
2. Reducing agency cost 
3. Selecting & rewarding CEO 
4. Evaluating CEO and company 
performance 
5. Strategic decision making and 
control 
1. Scanning the environment 
2. Representing the firm in the 
community 
3. Securing valuable resources 
Company 
performance 
criteria 
-survival 
-low operating costs 
-profitability 
-growth in resources 
-goal achievement 
-relative market position 
 
Agency theory relates to two key issues: the influence of board composition on 
organizational performance and the impact of corporate leadership structure on organizational 
performance. Considerable emphasis has been given to the issue of board composition from an 
agency perspective, which suggests that with a greater proportion of outside directors boards will 
be better able to monitor self-interested actions by managers and will thereby minimize agency 
costs. The issue of duality in the role of chief executive and chairman of the board has also 
received much attention. According to Ingley and van der Walt (2001), from an agency 
perspective this role, commonly combined in US companies, is best separated or at least 
                                               
2 Source: made by author 
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counterbalanced by a lead outside director to reduce the opportunity for a powerful chief 
executive to dominate the board. 
According to Ingley and van der Walt (2001), from the resource dependence view, the 
board is seen as a potentially important strategic resource for the organization, especially in 
linking the firm to external resources, such as providing a linkage to a nation’s business elite, 
access to capital, connections to competitors, or market and industry intelligence. Diversity in 
this context argues for a broader range of backgrounds among external directors in providing this 
resource. 
Additional key roles of the board are: providing advice and counsel to the chief executive 
and management, and contributing to, or approving strategy. Neither agency theory nor the 
resource dependence view adequately takes into account these key aspects of governance, which 
are also central to the rationale for diversity in the boardroom, depending on the organization’s 
life-cycle stage and its operating environment (Ingley and van der Walt, 2001). 
According to Milliken and Martins (1996), there are two categories of diversity – 
observable diversity such as the readily detectable attributes of directors, and less visible 
diversity, such as the background of directors. Observable diversity includes race/ethnic 
background, nationality, gender and age, while less visible diversity comprises educational, 
functional and occupational backgrounds, industry experience, and organizational membership. 
Some of the advantages of board diversity include promotion of a better understanding of 
the market place, increased creativity and innovation, and effective problem solving. Further, 
board diversity can promote more effective global relationships and increase board independence 
because people with different gender, ethnicity or cultural background might ask questions that 
would not come from directors with more traditional backgrounds. 
1.4. Impact of Board Structure on Earnings Management 
The composition and structure of boards of directors can influence many organizational 
results. This concept seems to be consistent in academic literature. The researchers began to 
investigate the effect of board diversity, which may be defined as a variety in board composition. 
This diversity can be measured in a number of ways: gender, age, ethnicity, nationality, 
education, work experience and organizational membership. 
The composition of the board of directors is an essential mechanism of corporate 
governance that can control the opportunistic behavior of managers and thus reduce earnings 
management (Man et al., 2013). Composition of the board includes deciding on the mix of non-
executive and executive directors, entitling audit and compensations committees, deciding on the 
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mix of required qualifications as well as deciding on the proportion of the females on the board. 
Internal management mechanisms could also be considered. According to Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2000), these include the proportion of independent directors of the board of 
directors, as well as the number of board meetings.  Al-Thuneibat et al. (2016), in the study of 
Saudi Arabian companies found no statistically significant impact of internal audit, audit 
committee and boards of directors on earnings management. 
Independent directors 
Concept of independent directors is one of the most crucial factors for the practices of 
good corporate governance that the companies should have an independent board of directors to 
improve the effectiveness of the board.  According to Anderson et al. (2004), independent 
directors can make a positive contribution to the monitoring responsibilities of the board. Also, 
Dunn (2004) found some evidence that presence of the independent directors on the boards is 
correlated with less cases of fraudulent financial reporting. 
Substantial amount of literature has shown apprehension on the relationship between 
reduced levels of earnings management and independence of board members (Hwang & Kim, 
2009). Studies by Deachow and Dichev (2002), Peasnell and Young (2000), showed how 
independence of board can decrease earnings management. The reason is that independent 
directors don’t chase their personal interests such as executive compensation or the pressure to 
meet the expectations regarding the performance of a firm.  Board independence is necessary to 
control the actions of the managers in order to safeguard the investors’ interests.  Independence 
of a board can also aid in preventing abuse of power by managers. According to Xie et al., 
(2003), companies, whose boards have more independent outside directors, have fewer 
occurrences of earnings management practices. In the research by Davidson et al., (2005), which 
was based on the cross-sectional sample of 434 companies in Australia, a majority of non-
executive directors on the board is associated with a minor chance of earnings management. 
Another study by Peasnell et al., (2004), focused on the relationship between board monitoring 
and likelihood of earnings management. The results showed that the chance of managers making 
income-increasing accruals has a negative relation with the percentage of outsiders on the board. 
According to Dechow et al. (1996), companies with widespread earnings management have a 
higher likelihood to be controlled by insiders than by outsiders. Likewise, research by Beasley 
(1996) showed that the larger number of outside board directors can decrease the chance of 
fraudulent financial information. Research by Peasnell et al. (2005), demonstrated that a greater 
fraction of outside directors in the UK is more effective in constraining income-increasing 
discretionary accruals. Numbers of researches demonstrate negative relationship between 
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independence of board and the degree of earnings management (Xie et al., 2003; Peasnell et al., 
2000; Davidson, 2005). Talbi et al. (2015), in their study of 7481 US firms found that 
independence of boards of directors can mitigate the level of real earnings management. Study 
by Klein (2002), found a negative relationship between the independence of board and earnings 
management in the USA. Alves (2014), also found that independent board members improve 
earnings quality by reducing earnings management for a sample of Portuguese listed firms.  
Zgarni et al. (2014), in an analysis of Tunisian companies found that a board comprising 
majority of independent directors reduces the extent of real earnings management. Majority of 
these researches study earnings management according to discretionary accruals method. 
However, Ianniello (2015), in a research conducted on a sample of Italian listed firms found that 
board independence has no influence on a proxy of earnings management.   
H01: Companies with a larger number of independent directors on board will have lower level 
of earnings management. 
Size of the board 
The optimal size of the board members is guaranteed by the sufficient number of board 
members to execute monitoring and control functions successfully. Research by Rahman and Ali 
(2006) showed that board size is positively related with earnings management. Alternatively, 
research by Xie et al. (2003) showed that the boards smaller in size are better suited to make 
suitable decisions in comparison with larger boards. Bushman et al. (2004), concludes that 
smaller boards have decreased costs of coordination, but at the same time have less  advisors and 
monitors of management. According to Carter et al. (2004), the larger the board becomes, the 
less powerful it can become as the communication between directors in practice would become 
more difficult. Carter et al. (2004), further suggest that the maximum number of director on the 
boards to comprise 10 directors. Yet, the same research also indicated that the larger boards are 
more effective in restraining earnings management than the boards smaller in size. Xie et al. 
(2003) also indicated that boards large in size which have different experts have a higher 
likelihood to have a higher degree of independence in comparison with small boards. Likewise, 
research by Peasnell et al. (2004) showed that in comparison with smaller boards, larger boards 
are better in decreasing earnings management practices. 
H02: Companies with a larger size of the board will have lower level of earnings management. 
Gender diversity 
Previous studies have looked at the relationship between the number of female directors 
in the board with the degree of earnings management as well as earnings quality. According to 
Adams and Ferreira (2009), female board directors have a higher likelihood to have board 
23 
 
thoroughness and hence make more energy directed at monitoring and controlling managers’ 
performance.  Also as noted by Carter et al. (2003), female board members think more 
autonomously and are able to monitor the executives’ behavior and actions more efficiently 
comparing to male board members. This is one of the most critical controls for earnings 
management – firms with larger number of female board members can have better quality of 
earnings and also less earnings management, as autonomous thinking is crucial for spotting 
opportunistic behavior and demanding high quality financial reports. Additionally according to 
Krishnan and Parsons (2008), female board directors have more tendencies to be intolerant of 
opportunistic behavior comparing with male directors.  Female executives and leaders put more 
effort in building a culture of trust in a company through applying transformational strategies for 
empowering team members (Klenke, 2002). Such style of leadership which takes advantages of 
strengths of female leaders as shown in figure 2, predisposes to share information with female 
directors. Further Sunden and Surette (1998), demonstrate that female executives are less risk 
taking in decision making than male executives. Likewise, female directors are risk-averse as 
well (Hinz et al., 1997). By this logic, female board directors are more likely not to allow 
executives to manage the earnings, which would make the company face the risk and thus 
influencing company’s status. 
 
Fig. 2 Comparative strengths of board members of different sex and national culture
3
 
 
                                               
3 Hilb. M. (2005). New Corporate Governance. Successful Board Management Tools.  
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Interestingly, Ducharme et al. (2004), demonstrate that during IPOs companies are faced 
with more litigation if there is earnings management. Hence, as female directors are more risk 
averse to the chance of facing litigations and the loss of company status, female directors would 
monitor and control internal and external auditors more thoroughly. According to Srinidhi et al. 
(2011), female board directors can advance governance of the board in relationship to 
monitoring and controlling CEOs, improving communication and attendance of the board. 
Consequently, female presence on the board can aid in reducing earnings management. Arun et 
al. (2015) studied the influence of female directors on earnings management practices of U.K 
firms. The research found that firms with a higher number of female and independent female 
directors restrained earnings management practices in the UK firms. However, Shamsul Nahar et 
al. (2016), in the study of Malaysian companies have found that presence of women on board of 
directors or audit committee is not associated with a tendency for earnings management. 
H03: Companies with larger gender diversity on board will have lower level of earnings 
management. 
Age diversity 
According to Timmerman (2000), when people have different ages they have different 
skills and information, so this diversity might be important as it can contribute to the quality of 
the performance. Figure 3 below provides summary of comparative strengths of older and 
younger board members and top management. Age diversity might bring experience and 
perspectives which are important for the workplace. Those people who reflect a diversity of 
experience through their age will be able to offer different bases of expertise, hence can add 
valuable contribution to the decisions of the board (Westpal and Milton, 2000).  The older group 
can provide experience and wisdom, the middle group takes responsibility in corporations and in 
society, and the younger group uses the energy and drive to succeed and plan. 
According to Kang et al. (2007), there is an argument that as different types of 
stakeholders each company must represent on boards, diversity in age of directors can help the 
process by adding different perspectives. 
According to Kang et al. (2007), the age of directors reflects their knowledge in business 
and serves as a proof of their maturity in managing the company. Studies by Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) make a note that older board members demonstrate judgment that is more 
conventional and moral.  Because of this conventional judgment, it is more likely that board with 
older members will have better quality of earnings. Nonetheless, this trend is altering, and there 
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is vigorous promotion of the diversity of age, that would ensure various perspectives on the 
issues (Kang et al. 2007). 
 
 
Fig. 3 Comparative strengths of older and younger members of board and top 
management
4
 
H04: Companies with larger age diversity on board will have lower level of earnings 
management. 
1.5. Impact of Ownership Structure on Earnings Management 
Institutional ownership 
According to Lang and McNichols (1997), institutional investors are organizations such 
as insurance companies, investment funds, pension funds, investment companies, financial 
institutions and other companies which can be associated with such organizations. According to 
Mitra (2002), institutional investors have strong enticement to collect information about the 
corporations in which they have invested or plan to make investment. The larger the amount of 
investment, the larger is motivation to watch closely any earnings manipulation. According to 
                                               
4 Hilb. M. (2005). New Corporate Governance. Successful Board Management Tools.  
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Monks and Minow (1995), institutional investors possess resources and ability to control, 
restrain and impact manager’s decision in the company. According to Richard, Michael and 
Jeong-Bon Kim (2002), institutions with large shareholding participate actively in watching over 
and controlling managerial opportunism in managing the reported earnings. The reason being 
that institutions which invest in the long term period are more worried about the fundamental 
profitability of the company and thus are cautious about the use of discretionary accruals to 
manage the earnings.  Mitra et al. (2005), in their study which examined the relationship between 
institutional stock ownership and management’s accounting discretion to manage accruals, found 
that there exists an inverse relationship between institutional ownership and the discretion of 
managers to manipulate earnings. According to Ajay et al. (2015), in the study of Indian 
companies, companies with higher institutional ownership were found to have higher earnings 
quality, hence restricting managers from using discretionary powers to report earnings. The 
study has also found that institutional ownership has a negative relationship with earnings 
management for larger and matured companies. While growing companies were found to have 
higher earnings management. Ajay et al. (2015), state that institutional investors monitor 
companies and therefore reduce aggressive earnings management practices within the company. 
Mehrani et al. (2017), in their study of Iranian companies found that institutional ownership has 
a positive effect on earnings quality. However, Chandra (2018), in the study of manufacturing 
companies listed at Indonesian Stock Exchange, has found that institutional ownership has no 
significant effect on earnings management. 
H05: Companies with larger proportion of institutional ownership will have lower level of 
earnings management. 
State ownership 
The study by Bauwhede et al. (2003) where the data about Belgian firms were used 
showed that public ownership serves as a motivation to manage earnings in upward direction 
thus impacting positively discretionary accruals. In the study by Xu et al. (2012), the impact of 
ownership structure on the quality of reported earnings of the companies listed on the Chinese 
Stock Exchange was studied. The results indicate that firms with private, foreign and society 
ownership perform better in terms of earnings quality than the state controlled companies. Lai et 
al. (2017), in the study of Chinese listed firms found that higher state ownership is related to 
higher likelihood of earnings management practice. However, other studies show that ownership 
structure is important for restraining opportunistic earnings management. According to Li 
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(2010), and Shen and Chen (2009), that state shareholding served as a crucial mechanism of 
corporate governance.  However, according to Cheng  et al. (2015), by using a sample of 437 
Chinese IPO firms,  they have found that state-owned companies manage earnings to a lesser 
degree that non-state-owned companies around IPO. According to Gaio et al. (2018), their 
research of public and private European companies during 2003-2010 has showed that  state-
owned companies display less conservatism than non-state-owned companies, which is in line 
with the notion that there is less demand for accounting conservatism due to government 
protection. Their findings also suggest that state-owned companies have higher abnormal 
accruals and worse accruals quality than non-state-owned companies. According to Ding et al.  
(2007), their analysis of 273 private and public companies showed that private companies seek to 
maximize their accounting revenues more. According to Wang et al. (2011), their research of 
Chinese companies has found lower levels of earnings management among state owned 
enterprises than privately owned companies. Wang et al. (2001) also arrive to the conclusion that 
the protection of state enterprises by the government might have played crucial role in 
moderating the pressure on managers to manipulate company-specific information. 
H06: Companies with larger proportion of state ownership will have lower level of earnings 
management. 
1.6. Corporate Governance in Kazakhstan 
According to the report of IFC Central Asia corporate governance project (2010), the 
result of IFC’s survey demonstrate that the issues of corporate governance development are 
becoming more urgent for Kazakhstan companies. They attribute such results to the factors such 
as intention of companies to go public, attract domestic and foreign investment and enhance 
operational efficiency and a company’s image. The majority of respondents confirms that 
adherence to corporate governance standards increases possibility of better access to capital 
markets and significantly enhances their investment attractiveness. Companies also become more 
sustainable from a financial point of view. This is because they attend more carefully to the 
rights and interests of shareholders and stakeholders. Similarly Alimbetov et al. (2016), conclude 
that the issue of corporate governance is gaining attention in Kazakhstan due to a number of of 
following factors: 
o An active search for opportunities to attract foreign investment for the future development; 
o Increasing interest in mergers and acquisitions between Kazakhstani companies; 
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o Increasing interest of Kazakh companies to participate in world’s leading foreign stock 
exchanges with high standards of the corporate governance – London Stock Exchange, New 
York Stock Exchange; 
o Understanding that improved corporate standards affect the ratings and are crucial for 
strengthening investor’s trust; 
According to Akhmetova (2017), the following are the peculiarities of corporate 
governance in Kazakhstan: 
1. Ownership concentration 
2. Insufficient separation of ownership and control 
3. Cumbersome holding structures 
4. Continuous reorganization 
5. Inexperienced and malfunctioning boards of directors 
Report prepared by Cigna G.P., Kobel Ya. & Sigheartau A. (2017) presents an 
assessment of board structure of the ten largest listed companies Kazakhstan. The assessment 
aimed at measuring the state of status, gaps between local laws & regulations and international 
standards, effectiveness of implementation in the area of corporate governance. Overall, the 
assessment identifies that neither the law nor the Corporate Governance Code requires listed 
companies’ committees to be made up of a majority of independent directors nor such a practice 
is common among companies. Also boards are small and legal entities cannot be board members. 
Although there is a lack of legal requirement regarding board members’ qualification (except for 
the banks), boards appear to have a diversified mix of skills. And finally, gender diversity on 
boards is very limited. Table 2 below presents in detail the results of the assessment of board 
structure in Kazakhstan. 
Table 2 Assessment of board structure in Kazakhstan
5
 
 
BOARD COMPOSITION ASSESSMENT -  FAIR 
STRENGTHS o Boards are small, with an average of 5,8 members 
o Legal entities cannot serves as board members 
o CEO cannot be the chair of the board and of its committees 
o The law requires all companies to set up committees to deal with 
the strategy planning, personnel and remuneration, internal audit 
and social issues. 
                                               
5 Cigna G.P., Kobel Ya. & Sigheartau A. (2017) 
29 
 
o Most of the companies disclose the qualification of the board 
members 
o Board members of banks are required to hold a university degree 
and the chair to have banking industry expertise. The Corporate 
Governance Code recommends the board to be comprised of 
highly skilled professionals. The law is silent in this respect 
though. Boards appear to have a diversified mix of skills.  
WEAKNESSES o CEO is the only executive director allowed to be a member of 
the board. 
o The law requires the chair of the strategic planning, resource and 
remuneration, internal audit and social issues committees to be 
an independent director, but it seems that this requirement is not 
well implemented 
o Neither the law nor the Corporate Governance Code requires 
listed companies committees to be made up of a majority of 
independent directors. 
 
 
GENDER DIVERSITY AT THE BOARD – VERY WEAK 
WEAKNESSES o The law and the Corporate Governance Code are silent on 
gender diversity at the board. 
o All then largest listed companies disclose the board composition. 
Five out of the ten largest companies have between one and two 
women in their boards. 
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS - WEAK 
STRENGTHS o All JSCs are required to have at least 30% of independent board 
members. Eight of the ten largest listed companies state they 
comply with this requirement. 
WEAKNESSES o The definition of independence is not comprehensive as it does 
not demand that independent members present an independent 
state of mind, judgement. It should be pointed out that the 
concepts of “non-affiliation” and “independence” are different.  
While non-affiliation can be established by negative criteria, 
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independence necessarily needs objectivity of mind and 
character, which is a positive character that should be 
demonstrated, disclosed and explained in practice. Only one 
company discloses the criteria adopted to consider its members 
as independent. 
 
As for the link between earnings management and corporate governance only one study 
was conducted by Baimukhamedova et al. (2015). Their research concentrated on studying the 
effect of corporate governance on companies’ earnings management by empirically studying 
Kazakhstani companies in natural resources sector. This study was limited by the sample of 24 
companies and time span of 5 years. The study demonstrated that board size, board 
independence, firm size, cash flows have insignificant relationship with the earnings 
management. Firm performance and extent of leverage showed to have significant relationships 
with the earnings management.  The study was based on accounting accruals approach to 
measure earnings management. 
 
1.7. Summary 
In conclusion, the notion that structure of boards of directors and ownership can influence 
a variety of organizational outcomes is consistent across academic literature. Literature identifies 
three areas in which board composition is posited to affect firm performance: service, resource 
acquisition, and control.  As for the case of Kazakhstan, the literature review shows that a limited 
number of studies were conducted about the association between earnings management and 
relevant level of corporate governance systems development. Preceding studies conducted 
locally focused on the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. 
There is a gap in understanding the relationship between board of directors characteristics 
and ownership structure with earnings management for companies listed at KASE. Therefore, 
the research will be of use for companies listed at KASE and other companies in Kazakhstan as 
it will contribute to their understanding of the importance of efficient board structures as a vital 
monitoring and control mechanism, which ensures that companies provide high quality and 
trustworthy financial information. 
Research goal  
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The goal of the research is to establish the relationship between the board of directors 
characteristics and ownership structure with the earnings management of companies listed at 
Kazakhstan Stock Exchange.  
Research questions 
o What is the structure of the board of directors of Kazakhstani listed companies? 
o Does board structure (size, independence, gender diversity and age diversity) of Kazakhstani 
listed companies have a relationship with the earnings management?  
o What is the ownership structure of Kazakhstani listed companies? 
o Does ownership structure of Kazakhstani listed companies have a relationship with the earnings 
management?  
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were formulated as a result of literature review to establish the 
relationship of the structure of board of directors and ownership with earnings management of 
Kazakhstan’s listed companies: 
H01: Companies with a larger number of independent directors on board will have lower level of 
earnings management. 
H02: Companies with a larger size of the board will have lower level of earnings management. 
H03: Companies with larger gender diversity on board will have lower level of earnings 
management. 
H04: Companies with larger age diversity on board will have lower level of earnings 
management. 
H05: Companies with larger proportion of institutional ownership will have lower level of 
earnings management. 
H06: Companies with larger proportion of state ownership will have lower level of earnings 
management. 
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Chapter 2. Empirical Study of the Relationship between Board of 
Directors Characteristics, Ownership Structure and Earnings 
Management of Kazakhstani Listed Companies 
  
2.1. Research Methodology 
This paper represents an explanatory type of research, as it is best fit to identify the extent 
and nature of cause-and-effect relationships. In the following sections of this chapter I elaborate 
further on the methodology and analysis. The data sources and collection will be presented as 
well as the variables which will be used in the research. Finally, the data analysis will be 
presented.  
2.1.1. Data collection 
This research serves as an attempt to obtain a realistic picture of the Kazakhstani market 
through an empirical analysis of the subject. Data is collected through the companies’ archives. 
All the required and necessary information regarding the board and ownership structure is 
presented in the annual reports which are available on the corporate websites as well as on the 
KASE’s website. The Thomson Reuters and Eikon Datastreams were used to collect data 
necessary for calculation Earnings Management proxy – Discretionary Accruals. 
The initial sample consists of 77 companies listed at Kazakhstan Stock Exchange. The 
period of analysis is for the 7 years, through 2010-2016, as doing so ensures the maximum 
amount of data available. Following previous researches, 18 firms from the financial services 
industry such as banks and insurance companies were excluded, as the characteristics of this 
industry are different, which are difficult to compare and derive earnings management proxy. 
Further, 24 companies with the insufficient data for assessing earnings management and 
governance information were removed from the initial list. After merging the available data, it 
leaves us with a final sample of 245 firm-year observations from 35 unique companies. 
2.1.2. Empirical Model 
The data collected is analyzed through the multiple regressions in order to understand 
whether we can predict a general trend for the relationship between the board and ownership 
structure and the earnings management.      
The following empirical model is used to conduct the multiple regression analysis: 
33 
 
EM= β0 + β1SIZE + β2IND + β3GEN + β4AGE + β5INST + β6STATE  + β7LNSIZE + ε 
EM is a proxy for accrual based earnings management. SIZE, IND, GEN, AGE, INST and 
STATE stand for the degree of board size, board independence, gender diversity, age diversity, 
institutional ownership, state ownership and managerial ownership  respectively. LNSIZE  is a 
control variable. 
β0  stands for regression constant. 
The coefficients of β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6 and β7 are required to test the effect of corresponding 
variables on earnings management.  
ε stands for error term.  
To confirm the hypotheses of the research F-test is used to determine the extent to which 
board and ownership structure contributes to the use of earnings management. The model of 
coefficients of the independent variables and their P-values were used as well. The tests were 
performed  at 95% confidence level and at 5% significance level. 
2.1.3. Variables 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this research is earnings management. This research will be 
based on accounting accruals approach to measure earnings management. According to Healy 
(2001), accruals include a wide range of possible implications to practice earnings management 
techniques (mainly, accounting policy choices and various estimates). Discretionary accruals are 
widely used all over the world by managers to move the earnings from one period to the other. 
There are number of various models to calculate discretionary accruals. In the study by 
Dechow et al. (1995), various models were discussed and compared and the conclusion reached 
at the paper was that the Modified Jones model is the best model fit for detecting earnings 
management. Following the previous researches, the Modified Jones model is used in this 
research.  
Discretionary accruals are calculated by measuring non-discretionary accruals as part of 
the total accrual in the Modified Jones model. 
The total accruals are calculated as follows: 
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TACCt = NIt - CFOt 
Where,  
TACCt = Total accruals in year t 
NIt = Net Income in year t 
CFOt = Cash flow from operating activities in year t 
With the total accruals calculated at the next step the Modified Jones Model is estimated, as 
defined below: 
TACCt
At−1
= α1
1
At−1
+  α2
(∆REVt − ∆RECt )
At−1
 +  α3
PPEt 
At−1
+ εt 
 
 
TACCt = Total accruals in year t divided by total assets in year t − 1, 
∆REVt = Revenues in year t less revenues in year t − 1, 
∆RECt  = Delta revenues in year t less delta net receivables in year t − 1, 
PPEt  = Gross property plant and equipment in year t, 
At−1 = Total assets in year t − 1, 
 α1, α2, and α3 = Parameters to be estimated, namely alphas, 
εt = Residuals in year t. 
Alphas, coefficients or parameters are estimated by means of an ordinary least squares regression 
(OLS). These alphas are required in the following step to measure non-discretionary part of 
accruals with the following formula: 
NDACCt
At−1
= α̂1
1
At−1
+  α̂2
(∆REVt − ∆RECt )
At−1
 +  α̂3
PPEt 
At−1
 
NDACCt = Non-discretionary accruals divided by total assets in year t − 1, 
∆REVt = Revenues in year t less revenues in year t − 1, 
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∆RECt  = Net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t − 1, 
PPEt  = Gross property plant and equipment in year t, 
At−1 = Total assets in year t − 1, 
α̂1, α̂2, and α̂3 = Estimated parameters, namely alphas from previous regression 
Finally, discretionary accruals are estimated by subtracting the non-discretionary portion of the 
accruals from the total accrual. 
DACCt = TACCt − NDACCt 
Independent variables 
In this research there are seven explanatory variables which are used to measure the 
impact of board and ownership structure on earnings management. 
1. SIZE – board size is the total number of executive and non-executive directors in the board. It is 
measured as the total number of directors in the board. 
2. IND – board independence, which is a percentage of independent outside directors in the board. 
It is measured as ratio of non-executive directors to the total number of directors.  
3. GEN – gender diversity which refers to the female representation in the board. It is measured as 
a ratio of female directors to the total number of directors. 
4. AGE – age diversity, which is measured by the standard deviation of the age of the board 
members of a corresponding firm. 
5. INST – institutional ownership, which is measured by the ratio of shares owned by institutional 
shareholders to total number of outstanding shares. 
6. STATE – state ownership, which is measured by the ratio of shares owned by state entities to 
total number of outstanding shares. 
Control variable 
The control variable used to control for other factors which otherwise bias the regression 
coefficients is LNSIZE to control for the impact of company size. According to Francis & Wang  
(2008), prior studies showed that larger firms have a tendency to have lower levels of accruals 
than smaller firms.  Firm size is measured through natural logarithm of total assets. 
The table below summarizes the variables and their definitions. 
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Table 3 Summary of variable definitions 
Variables Description 
Dependent  
EM Accrual-based earnings management, measured by Modified Jones 
Model 
Independent  
SIZE Board size, measured as the total number of directors in the board 
IND Board independence, measured as ratio of non-executive directors 
to the total number of directors 
GEN Gender diversity, measured as a ratio of female directors to the total 
number of directors 
AGE Age diversity, measured by the standard deviation of the age of the 
board members of a corresponding firm 
INST Institutional ownership, which is measured by the ratio of shares 
owned by institutional shareholders to total number of outstanding 
shares 
STATE State ownership, which is measured by the ratio of shares owned by 
state entities to total number of outstanding shares 
Control 
LNSIZE Firm size is measured through natural logarithm of total assets 
 
2.2. Empirical Results and Discussion 
2.2.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
EM -,548 ,496 245 
SIZE 5,48 2,126 245 
 LNSIZE 17,296 1,943 245 
 IND ,393 ,100 245 
 GEN ,075 ,150 245 
AGE  9,328 3,418 245 
INST ,077 ,190 245 
 STATE ,144 ,318 245 
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Table 4 above shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables 
that were used in the regression model and states the mean and standard deviation of the latter. 
Thus, with respect to Board characteristics, we can observe that in Kazakhstani listed companies 
the Board on average is composed of 5-6 people, of whom approximately 39% are independent 
external directors. This fact clearly indicates that composition of this executive organ is mainly 
made up from internal members, which potentially can serve as a signal of increased potential 
for earnings manipulation. However, current requirements in Kazakhstan require that at 30% of 
the Board to be represented by independent directors. Thus, the average percentage of 39% is 
regarded as evidence that companies show a tendency to comply with worldwide corporate 
governance practices. 
The mean for gender diversity comprises 7,5%, meaning that around 8% of the board 
members are females. This number is lagging behind the global averages. Globally, the number 
of women on boards has been increasing for the last three years, According to ISS Quality Score 
data, overall female representation has increased on the boards from 14,5% in 2014, to 15,3%  in 
2015, and 16,9% in 2016. While the global numbers are still small, the average number for 
Kazakhstani companies is significantly smaller. This can be explained by the fact that there are 
no strong regulations which would require the minimum level of diversity and the social norms 
in Kazakhstan do not require some change in regulatory framework. 
The mean for age diversity is 9,3, which was measured by the standard deviation of the 
age of the board members. According to the Research by Barret (2017) of S&P 500 companies, 
the average standard deviation of ages of directors was 7,2. The higher this number, the higher is 
a chance that more decades are represented on the boardroom.  
With respect to ownership structure, we can observe that on average 7,8 % are 
institutional shareholders and 14,4% are government owned. The higher number for state 
ownership corresponds to the reality and can be explained by the fact that Kazakhstan has been 
going through transformation from state economy to a private sector centered economy, with 
government holding the majority stake in a number of largest companies through Sovereign 
Wealth Fund “Samruk-Kazyna”. 
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2.2.2.  Regression results 
Table 5 Model Summary: Regression results 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate 
 
Durbin-
Watson 
R 
Square 
Change 
1 ,502
a
 0,301 0,274 ,379 0,301 1,361 
a. Predictors: (Constant), state ownership, gender diversity, 
institutional ownership ,age diversity, Independence, board Size, 
firm size 
b. Dependent Variable: EM 
 
R-square of the current research is .301 and adjusted R-square equals to .274 meaning 
that approximately 27,4 % of the Earnings Management variability is explained by the 
independent variables selected.   
Table 6 discussing Model Summary also shows the result of Durbin-Watson statistical 
test. This test statistics is used to detect the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals from the 
regression results. Small values of Durbin-Watson statistics indicate the presence of 
autocorrelations. The value generally falls somewhere within the range of 0 and 4, for the current 
research the value comprises 1.361, which is close to the mid-point 2 and thus proves the 
assumption that there is no autocorrelation between the residual errors. 
Table 6 ANOVA: Regression results 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
1 
Regression 5.496 7 0,785 3,402 ,002
b
 
Residual 54,697 237 0,231 
 
 Total 60,193 244 
  
 a. Dependent Variable: EM 
b. Predictors: (Constant), state ownership, gender diversity, institutional 
ownership , age diversity, independence, board size, firm size 
 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) implies the statistical test of whether or not the means of 
several groups are equal and analyzes the differences between the latter. The analysis of variance 
can be used as an exploratory tool to explain observations and make decisions using statistical 
data. The result of the test is called statistically significant if it is considered unlikely to have 
happened by accident, assuming the null hypothesis is true. A result is statistically significant, 
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when the probability (p-value) is less than the threshold (significance level), explains  the 
rejection of the null hypothesis. 
If the significance level is less than .05 (i.e. 5%) then there is a statistically significant 
difference in the mean earnings management between the various independent variables assumed 
to have an effect on the latter. The F-ratio presented in ANOVA table gives us the idea of 
whether the overall regression model is a good fit for the selected and tested data. Table 7 shows 
that independent variables significantly predict the nature of Earnings Management: F(7, 237) = 
3,402, p=.005. This means that the regression model is a perfect fit of the analyzed data). The 
level of significance is Sig=,002 which falls within the 5% range. 
 
Regression equation 
EM= -1, 511- 0,059SIZE+0,600IND+0,548GEN-0,025AGE+0,054LNSIZE+ 0,064INST-0,120STATE 
In order to get an understanding of relationships between Earnings Management and 
independent variables, namely board of directors' size, board independence, gender diversity, age 
diversity, firm size, institutional ownership and state ownership it is useful to determine the 
regression equation, which summarizes the overall research outcome. The coefficients for each 
variable indicate the level/amount of change one could expect in Earnings Management given a 
one-unit increase/decrease in the value of any particular variable assuming that all other 
variables tested in the model are held constant. 
Table 7 Analysis of regression coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta 
1 
(Constant) -1,511 0,576   
-
4,742 
0 
SIZE -0,059 0,027 -0,122 
-
2,757 
0,006 
IND 0,600 0,358 0,121 1,679 0,095 
GEN 0,548 0,214 0,168 2,563 0,011 
AGE -0,025 0,009 -0,171 
-
2,658 
0,008 
LNSIZE 0,054 0,022 0,210 2,433 0,016 
INST 0,064 0,176 0,025 0,363 0,717 
STATE -0,120 0,135 -0,077 -,884 0,377 
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Therefore, one unit increase in Board Size would result in 0,059 decrease in Earnings 
Management (EM) and one unit increase in Board Independence would mean 0,600 increase in 
EM. If gender diversity increases for one level, then EM for that particular case would also 
increase by 0,548. Unit increase in age diversity would result in 0,025 decrease in EM. One unit 
increase in firm size would increase EM by 0,054. Further, one unit increase in institutional 
ownership would result in 0,064 increase in EM. Finally, increase in state ownership by one unit 
would lead to decrease in EM by 0,120. 
 At the next step we identify whether a multiple regression coefficient is statistically 
significant. It is noted that when a large number of explanatory variables are used within a small 
sample, observed multiple correlations are quite large and at the same time they vary widely 
from their population values. This issue is resolved by the help of multiple regression procedure 
which assigns greatest weight to those variables having the strongest relationship with the 
criterion variables in the sample data. Lack of statistical significant might serve as a signal point 
meaning that an observed multiple correlations might turn occurred by chance. 
As such according to the Table 8 discussing each regression coefficient in details, the 
following conclusions are made in regards to the predictive power and significance level each of 
the selected independent variable have on Earnings Management: 
o Board independence (IND) has no significant relationship with decrease of the Earnings 
Management, level of significance sig = 0,095. Thus, hypothesis #1 is rejected. 
o Board size (SIZE) has a significant positive relationship with decrease of the Earnings 
Management, level of significance =0,006. Thus, hypothesis #2 is accepted. 
o Gender diversity (GEN) is significantly related to the Earnings Management, level of 
significance = 0, 011. However, it has significant positive relationship with an increase of EM. 
Therefore, hypothesis #3 is not confirmed. 
o Age diversity (AGE) has a significant positive relationship with decrease of the Earnings 
Management, level of significance =, 008. Thus, hypothesis #4 is accepted. 
o Institutional ownership (INST) has no significant relationship with decrease of the Earnings 
Management, level of significance = 0,717. Thus, hypothesis #5 is rejected. 
o State ownership (STATE) has no significant relationship with decrease of the Earnings 
Management, level of significance = 0,377. Thus, hypothesis #6 is rejected 
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Table 8 Research results 
Hypothesis Research results Rejected/Accepted 
H1 Board independence (IND) has no significant relationship 
with decrease of EM, sig = 0,095 
Rejected 
H2 Board size (SIZE) has a significant positive relationship 
with decrease of EM, sig=0,006 
Accepted 
H3 Gender diversity (GEN) is significantly related to the EM, 
sig = 0, 011. However, it has significant positive 
relationship with an increase of EM. 
Rejected 
H4 Age diversity (AGE) has a significant positive relationship 
with decrease of EM, sig = ,008 
Accepted 
H5 Institutional ownership (INST) has no significant 
relationship with decrease of EM, level of sig = 0,717 
Rejected  
H6 State ownership (STATE) has no significant relationship 
with decrease of EM, sig = 0,377 
Rejected 
 
2.2.3. Summary of results 
The study has  found out that the size of the board on average comprise 5-6 persons, 
around 39% of which are independent external directors. This finding indicates that companies 
in Kazakhstan try to adhere to the international and national governance practices.  
We also found that the on average around 8% of the board members are female 
representatives, which is significantly lagging behind the world average. This is explained by the 
absence of regulatory norms requiring the minimum for gender diversity.  
On average the board’s age diversity measured by the standard deviation of ages of board 
members is 9,3 which is higher than the global average of 7,2.  
With respect to ownership structure, we observe that 7,8 % are institutional shareholders 
and 14,4% are government owned. The higher number for state ownership reflects the past 
economic system of the country. 
Finding of the study reveal that several hypothesized characteristics, namely size of the 
board, age and gender diversity influence the level of earnings management.  Further conclusions 
were that a unit increase in board size will cause a decrease in the level of earnings management; 
a unit increase in age diversity will lead to a decrease in the level of earnings management. It 
was also revealed that gender diversity has a positive relationship with the increase of earnings 
management in Kazakhstani listed companies.  
 Thus the study concludes that the companies, boards of which have larger  size and 
larger age diversity of board members will have lower level of earnings management. 
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2.2.4. Discussion of the findings 
Board size and earnings management  
The regression results showed that board size has a significant positive relationship with 
decrease of earnings management in Kazakhstan’s listed companies as was hypothesized in the 
research. The boards of Kazakhstan’s listed companies appear to be small with an average 5-6 
people. The results of the study are consistent with previous studies. A study by Xie et al. (2003) 
indicated that boards larger in size are more effective in controlling earnings management in 
comparison with boards smaller in size. Xie et al. (2003) also indicated that boards large in size 
which have different experts have a higher likelihood to have a higher degree of independence in 
comparison with small boards. Likewise, research by Peasnell et al. (2004) showed that in 
comparison with smaller boards, larger boards are better in decreasing earnings management 
practices. Therefore, the results of this research make a case for the increase of the board size, as 
companies with larger board size tend to have lower level of earnings management. 
Board independence and earnings management   
The regression results showed that board independence has no significant relationship 
with earnings management. Such result can be explained by the number of factors. First of all, 
the requirement to have independent directors in each joint-stock company appeared in the Law 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On Joint-Stock Companies" only in 2005. Currently, the 
legislation of many foreign countries requires the company to have independent directors not less 
than 1/3 of the total number of members of the board of directors.  According to an executive 
director of Kazakhstan National Directors Association Yerlan Beisembinov, in most joint-stock 
companies independent directors are only de jure independent, and de facto under the control of 
a large shareholder, and in case of controversial situations, instead of acting as independent 
arbitrators, they take his side, or on current issues vote for always correct and informed 
decisions, but which are beneficial to the shareholder. At the same time, they “forget” about the 
responsibility they bear as company officials. Some of the JSCs perceive independent directors 
as a kind of means to raise the image of the company or. The better the rating of their 
independent director, the better is the image of this JSC. Both shareholders and managers forget 
the invaluable benefits that an independent director can bring to the company. Another problem 
is the search and election of independent directors. In practice, it is often not a shareholder, but 
the executive body who proposes candidates for "its" independent directors. This choice violates 
the principle of impartiality and independence. After all, such independent directors will not 
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inform the shareholders of the problems that exist in the company. Hence, this approach doesn’t 
allow for the further development and transparency of the company.  There is also a problem of 
lack of information about the actual state of affairs in the company. This is due to insufficient 
feedback between the board of directors and management, between the board of directors and 
shareholders (especially in quasi-public companies), and perhaps this disadvantage is beneficial 
to the management itself, so that the board of directors makes decisions only in line with the 
information provided.  Lastly, there is a problem of a level of compensation of the independent 
director in Kazakhstan. In companies related to the exploration and extraction of natural 
resources (especially with foreign participation), the level of remuneration is good, however in 
companies of the quasi-public sector there is no remuneration at all or it does not correspond to 
the level of personal responsibility of independent directors as officials. These factors contribute 
to the erosion of the effectiveness of the board independence, which in turn explain the non-
significance of the relationship between board independence and earnings management in 
Kazakhstan’s listed companies obtained in this study. 
Gender diversity and earnings management 
The regression results showed that gender diversity has a significant positive relationship 
with increase in earnings management. Such a result is attributed to several factors. The 
regulatory background regarding board diversity in Kazakhstan doesn’t require any minimum 
gender diversity in the board of directors. On a country scale Kazakhstan joined the United 
Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals in 2015, which set out targets for equal rights and 
opportunities for both women and men. The new strategic approach will tie in the country’s 
existing programs and international sustainable development trends. The approach, signed by 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev late last year, commits the government by to improve the 
legislation in the field of family and gender policy. Removing obstacles for female employment 
and career growth is one of the goals of the new action plan. According to World Economic 
Forum’s  “The  Global Gender Gap report”, Kazakhstan ranked 52 out of 144 countries in global 
gender gap score in 2017. According to Kyaw et al. (2015), for the introduction of females on 
boards to be beneficial, it is necessary that gender equality in the country is already high.  
According to Einer and Soderqvist  (2016), females as a result of the lack of legislation 
concerning their positions on the board of directors need to adapt their behavior to their male 
counterparts in order to be appointed and re-appointed as directors on the board. Hence, their 
characteristics which were hypothesized to make a difference in terms of improved governance 
would diminish as female behavior converges with male behavior.  These factors explain the 
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positive relationship of gender diversity and earnings management of Kazakhstan’s listed 
companies. 
Age diversity 
The regression results showed that age diversity has a significant positive relationship 
with decrease in earnings management which was in line with a hypothesis statement. On 
average the board’s age diversity measured by the standard deviation of ages of board members 
is 9,3 which is higher than the global average of 7,2. The results of the study are consistent with 
the previous studies.    According to Kang et al. (2007), there is an argument that as different 
types of stakeholders each company must represent on boards, diversity in age of directors can 
help the process by adding different perspectives. In the case of Kazakhstan, these added 
different perspectives translated into restraining earnings management practices in Kazakhstan’s 
listed firms, thus making a case for further increased age diversity.  
Institutional ownership & State ownership 
The regression results showed that institutional ownership and state ownership have no 
significant relationship with earnings management. The fact that both of these types of 
ownership produce same results is consistent with Kazakhstan’s reality. Most of the institutional 
shareholding is distributed through pension funds and banks, the end majority shareholder of 
which is a state. Additionally, largest enterprises which have critical strategic influences on the 
market are characterized by high proportion of state ownership.  According to Heath and 
Norman (2004), firms with higher state ownership have often performed less effectively than 
privately owned ones. The reason being that state owned enterprises are less accountable to 
whole stakeholders and enjoy bailout from the state in case of default, managers in these firms 
tend to pay smaller attention to earnings management in case of budget deficit or loss. This can 
explain the loss of the hypothesized effectiveness of the state and institutional ownership, which 
in turn explain the non-significance of the relationship between state and institutional and 
earnings management in Kazakhstan’s listed companies obtained in this study.  
2.2.5. Managerial applications 
The results of the study have applications for various managers: policymakers, industry 
and financial managers. 
The results of this study can serve as a reference point for policymakers in their decision 
making and/or their further research. As previous researches and theories show corporate 
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governance can decrease or even eliminate the extent of earnings management. Generally, an 
institutional environment that provides better legal protection can control managers’ self-interest 
to a certain extent. Our research aids policymakers with providing information about the 
significant relationship between the size of the board and age diversity with earnings 
management. These finding are useful to take into consideration when designing improved 
policies of corporate governance. 
Industry (company) managers can use the findings of the research when designing the 
strategy of choosing board members as a new approach to maximize company’s good corporate 
governance practices. Thus, aiming at forming boards of directors with larger size of board 
members and larger age diversity can influence positively the decrease in the level of earnings 
management, which ultimately improves the credibility of financial reports in the eyes of 
shareholders and investors.  
Managers of financial institutions can take into account the results of the study in relation 
with the investment decisions into companies. Particularly when assessing company’s stance and 
ratings. Corporate governance practice serves as a company’s reputation; hence it is one of the 
important factors when evaluating the company. Investment institutions are also interested in 
receiving the trustful financial reports; therefore the fact of existence of significant positive 
relationship between size of the board and age diversity with decrease in the level of earnings 
management can serve as an indicator of credible reports. 
2.2.6.  Limitations of the study 
This study was limited to determine the relationship between the board of directors 
characteristics and ownership structure with earnings management of companies listed at 
Kazakhstan Stock Exchange. The study was limited to 35 companies listed at KASE.  The study 
limited to secondary data, which was collected from KASE and company financial reports. This 
data was used as obtained and the researcher had no means of independently verifying the 
validity of the data which was assumed to be accurate for the purpose of the study. The study 
findings are, therefore, partly subject to the validity of the secondary data used. The study was 
able to collect data from 35 companies listed in the KASE that were in operation for the last five 
years. The study was limited to a seven year period starting from 2010 to 2016. 
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Conclusion 
The goal of this research was to establish the relationship between board of directors 
characteristics and ownership structure with earnings management of Kazakhstan‘s listed 
companies. The research has found that the size of the board on average comprise 5-6 persons, 
around 39% of which are independent external directors. This finding indicates that companies 
in Kazakhstan try to adhere to the international and national governance practices. We also found 
that the on averages about 8% of the board members are female representatives, which is 
significantly lagging behind the world average. This is explained by the absence of regulatory 
norms requiring the minimum for gender diversity. On average the board’s age diversity 
measured by the standard deviation of ages of board members is 9,3 which is higher than the 
global average of 7,2. With respect to ownership structure, we observe that 7,8 % are 
institutional shareholders and 14,4% are government owned. The higher number for state 
ownership reflects the past economic system of the country. 
Findings of the study reveal that three of hypothesized characteristics of the board of 
directors affect earnings management.  Further conclusions were that a unit increase in board 
size will cause a decrease in in earnings management; a unit increase in age diversity will lead to 
a decrease in earnings management. It was also revealed that larger gender diversity leads to 
higher level of earnings management in Kazakhstani listed companies.  
Hence the study concludes that companies with larger board size and larger age diversity 
in board will have lower level of earnings management.  
This study contributes to the literature on the relationships between board of directors and 
ownership structure with earnings management at least two ways. Firstly, it focuses on Kazakh 
firms while very limited research has been conducted on Central Asia’ firms. Secondly, this 
study validates number of findings of previous authors by testing the relationships between board 
characteristics with earnings management on the sample of listed firms in Kazakhstan. 
Therefore, this research adds substance to the existing theory developed by previous researchers.  
The study also has application for managers across different sectors. For policymaker these 
finding are useful to take into consideration when designing improved policies of corporate 
governance. Industry managers can refer to the findings of the research when designing the 
strategy of choosing board members. Finally, financial managers of financial institutions can use 
the results of the study in relation with the investment decisions into companies.  
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Appendix 1. List of Companies Used 
 
№ Company 
1 EKOTON+ JSC (EKTN) 
2 Mangistau Distribution Electricity Network Company JSC (MREK) 
3 Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company (KEGOC) JSC (KEGC) 
4 Kazakhtelecom JSC (KZTK) 
5 Bayan Sulu JSC (BSUL) 
6 Rakhat JSC (RAHT) 
7 Atameken-Agro JSC (KATR) 
8 Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium Magnesium Plant JSC (UTMK) 
9 Mangistaumunaigaz JSC (MMGZ) 
10 KMK Munai JSC (LNPT) 
11 Zhairem Mining and Concentrating Complex JSC (JGOK) 
12 BAST JSC (BAST) 
13 AK Altynalmas JSC (ALMS) 
14 KazTransCom JSC (KZTC) 
15 National company "KazMunayGaz" JSC (KMGZ) 
16 SAT & Company JSC (SATC) 
17 KazTransOil JSC (KZTO) 
18 Maten Petroleum JSC (MATN) 
19 Ansagan Petroleum JSC (ANSA) 
20 Caspi neft JSC (KSNF) 
21 Asia Avto JSC (ASAV) 
22 Astel JSC (ASTL) 
23 Kazakh Republican Trading House ZANGAR JSC (ZNGR) 
24 Kaz Minerals PLC (GB_KZMS) 
25 Pavlodarenegro JSC (PDEN) 
26 International airport of Almaty JSC (ARAL) 
27 RG Brands JSC (RGBR) 
28 NC Kazakhstan temir zholy JSC (TMJL) 
29 Shymkent munai onimderi JSC 
30 Altyntau Kokshetau JSC (ATKT) 
31 KM Gold JSC (KMGD) 
32 Aktobe Oil Equipment Plant JSC (AZNO) 
33 Kazakhmys Copper JSC (KMCP) 
34 Kcell JSC (KCEL) 
35 Chimpharm JSC 
Appendix 2. Data 
 
№ Company 
Number 
Year Board 
Size 
Independence Gender 
Diversity 
Age 
Diversity 
Insitutional 
Ownership 
State 
Ownership 
Firm Size EM 
1 1 2010 5 0,20 0,20 5,20 0,00 0,00 15,84071 -0,26366 
2 1 2011 5 0,20 0,20 5,20 0,00 0,00 15,76023 -0,43902 
3 1 2012 5 0,20 0,20 5,20 0,00 0,00 15,75992 -0,60861 
4 1 2013 5 0,20 0,20 5,20 0,55 0,00 15,8933 -0,55783 
5 1 2014 6 0,33 0,33 3,24 0,55 0,00 15,79708 -0,49441 
6 1 2015 3 0,33 0,00 10,69 0,10 0,00 15,90988 -0,52891 
7 1 2016 3 0,33 0,00 10,69 0,10 0,00 16,07552 -0,4055 
8 2 2010 5 0,40 0,00 10,66 0,20 0,00 16,5871 -0,59435 
9 2 2011 5 0,40 0,00 10,66 0,20 0,00 16,56431 -0,66352 
10 2 2012 5 0,40 0,00 10,66 0,20 0,75 16,89782 -0,92763 
11 2 2013 5 0,40 0,20 10,66 0,20 0,75 17,04913 -0,73197 
12 2 2014 5 0,40 0,20 10,66 0,07 0,92 17,11687 -0,66117 
13 2 2015 5 0,40 0,00 10,66 0,07 0,92 17,25168 -0,77414 
14 2 2016 7 0,29 0,00 10,66 0,00 0,92 17,47737 -0,80082 
15 3 2010 6 0,50 0,00 13,65 0,00 0,00 19,01051 -0,5062 
16 3 2011 6 0,50 0,00 13,65 0,00 0,00 19,19802 -0,57187 
17 3 2012 6 0,50 0,00 13,65 0,00 1,00 19,26399 -0,51816 
18 3 2013 6 0,50 0,00 13,65 0,00 1,00 19,72175 -0,96017 
19 3 2014 6 0,50 0,00 13,65 0,00 0,90 20,1253 -0,84846 
20 3 2015 6 0,50 0,00 12,65 0,00 0,90 20,20463 -0,65476 
21 3 2016 8 0,50 0,13 11,36 0,00 0,90 20,26449 -0,60155 
22 4 2010 9 0,44 0,22 6,32 0,14 0,51 19,73053 -0,42729 
23 4 2011 9 0,44 0,22 6,32 0,14 0,51 19,8598 -0,47976 
55 
 
24 4 2012 9 0,44 0,22 6,32 0,14 0,51 19,854 0,07221 
25 4 2013 9 0,44 0,22 6,32 0,09 0,51 19,84567 -0,54887 
26 4 2014 9 0,44 0,22 6,32 0,08 0,51 19,84623 -0,59033 
27 4 2015 9 0,44 0,11 5,31 0,08 0,51 19,89382 -0,53612 
28 4 2016 9 0,44 0,11 5,31 0,08 0,51 19,96603 -0,41356 
29 5 2010 5 0,40 0,00 9,55 0,08 0,00 16,5991 -0,32564 
30 5 2011 5 0,40 0,00 9,55 0,08 0,00 16,6476 -0,38332 
31 5 2012 5 0,40 0,00 9,55 0,08 0,00 16,60685 -0,34714 
32 5 2013 5 0,40 0,00 9,55 0,00 0,00 16,69666 -0,43632 
33 5 2014 5 0,40 0,00 9,55 0,00 0,00 16,77851 -0,42745 
34 5 2015 5 0,40 0,00 9,55 0,00 0,00 17,05079 -0,44149 
35 5 2016 5 0,40 0,00 9,55 0,00 0,00 17,23806 -0,43237 
36 6 2010 3 0,33 0,00 8,50 0,00 0,00 16,50764 -0,39726 
37 6 2011 3 0,33 0,00 8,50 0,00 0,00 16,60179 -0,30875 
38 6 2012 3 0,33 0,00 8,50 0,00 0,00 17,05033 -0,30292 
39 6 2013 3 0,33 0,00 8,50 0,00 0,00 16,80247 -0,26887 
40 6 2014 5 0,40 0,00 7,56 0,00 0,00 16,89122 -0,30246 
41 6 2015 5 0,40 0,00 7,56 0,00 0,00 17,11735 -0,37128 
42 6 2016 5 0,40 0,00 7,56 0,00 0,00 17,31062 -0,20702 
43 7 2010 6 0,50 0,00 10,50 0,23 0,00 17,32018 -0,17731 
44 7 2011 6 0,50 0,00 10,50 0,23 0,00 17,29303 -0,28586 
45 7 2012 6 0,50 0,00 10,50 0,23 0,00 17,35759 -0,17984 
46 7 2013 6 0,50 0,00 10,50 0,00 0,22 17,06169 0,129076 
47 7 2014 6 0,50 0,00 10,50 0,20 0,22 16,75747 -0,00277 
48 7 2015 5 0,40 0,00 10,50 0,20 0,22 17,48861 -1,28207 
49 7 2016 6 0,67 0,00 10,20 0,22 0,14 17,91834 -0,67644 
50 8 2010 5 0,40 0,00 3,27 0,27 0,00 17,06908 -0,53623 
51 8 2011 5 0,40 0,00 3,27 0,27 0,00 17,2782 -0,60627 
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52 8 2012 5 0,40 0,00 3,27 0,27 0,00 17,42601 -0,55833 
53 8 2013 5 0,40 0,00 3,27 0,27 0,00 17,58082 -0,3026 
54 8 2014 5 0,40 0,00 3,27 0,27 0,00 17,78189 -0,38416 
55 8 2015 5 0,40 0,00 3,27 0,27 0,00 18,36 -0,13798 
56 8 2016 5 0,40 0,00 3,27 0,27 0,00 18,24423 -0,46996 
57 9 2010 6 0,33 0,00 10,68 0,99 0,00 19,52027 -0,50383 
58 9 2011 6 0,33 0,00 10,68 0,99 0,00 19,58082 -0,49162 
59 9 2012 6 0,33 0,00 10,68 0,99 0,00 19,51435 -0,52333 
60 9 2013 6 0,33 0,00 10,68 0,99 0,00 19,60125 -0,73123 
61 9 2014 6 0,33 0,00 10,68 0,99 0,00 19,74355 -0,6606 
62 9 2015 6 0,33 0,00 10,68 0,99 0,00 19,75247 -0,36564 
63 9 2016 6 0,50 0,00 10,68 0,99 0,00 19,79205 -0,69387 
64 10 2010 9 0,33 0,11 7,84 0,00 0,00 16,80748 -0,28318 
65 10 2011 9 0,33 0,11 7,84 0,00 0,00 16,95554 -0,65279 
66 10 2012 9 0,33 0,11 7,84 0,00 0,00 17,258 -0,78715 
67 10 2013 9 0,33 0,11 7,84 0,00 0,00 17,65605 -0,72435 
68 10 2014 9 0,33 0,11 7,84 0,00 0,00 17,89917 -0,7477 
69 10 2015 9 0,33 0,11 7,84 0,00 0,00 17,99444 -0,92649 
70 10 2016 9 0,33 0,11 7,84 0,00 0,00 17,98851 -0,59455 
71 11 2010 5 0,40 0,00 13,37 0,00 0,00 16,84241 -0,40209 
72 11 2011 5 0,40 0,00 13,37 0,00 0,00 16,85214 -0,43589 
73 11 2012 5 0,40 0,00 13,37 0,00 0,00 16,39277 -0,79273 
74 11 2013 5 0,40 0,00 13,37 0,00 0,00 16,22945 -0,88771 
75 11 2014 5 0,40 0,00 13,37 0,00 0,00 16,92509 -0,12966 
76 11 2015 5 0,40 0,00 13,37 0,00 0,00 17,14243 -0,28184 
77 11 2016 5 0,40 0,00 13,37 0,00 0,00 17,2346 -0,55997 
78 12 2010 3 0,33 0,00 13,00 0,00 0,00 12,24634 -2,81454 
79 12 2011 3 0,33 0,00 13,00 0,00 0,00 13,25234 -2,81454 
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80 12 2012 3 0,33 0,00 13,00 0,00 0,00 12,24634 -2,81454 
81 12 2013 3 0,33 0,00 15,31 0,00 0,00 13,25234 -2,95088 
82 12 2014 3 0,33 0,00 15,31 0,00 0,00 13,50299 -1,44322 
83 12 2015 5 0,40 0,00 10,03 0,00 0,00 14,01795 -1,86402 
84 12 2016 5 0,40 0,00 10,03 0,10 0,00 14,53764 -0,97832 
85 13 2010 3 0,33 0,33 4,93 0,00 0,00 16,96184 -0,17352 
86 13 2011 3 0,33 0,33 4,93 0,00 0,00 16,94011 -0,41211 
87 13 2012 3 0,33 0,33 4,93 0,00 0,00 17,21042 -0,75686 
88 13 2013 3 0,33 0,33 4,93 0,00 0,00 17,45773 -0,69526 
89 13 2014 3 0,33 0,00 4,93 0,00 0,00 17,74624 -0,87718 
90 13 2015 3 0,33 0,00 4,93 0,00 0,00 17,79915 -1,26562 
91 13 2016 3 0,33 0,00 4,93 0,00 0,00 17,89339 -0,70101 
92 14 2010 5 0,40 0,20 6,50 0,00 0,00 16,32154 -0,46813 
93 14 2011 5 0,40 0,20 6,50 0,00 0,00 16,42822 -0,46214 
94 14 2012 5 0,40 0,20 6,50 0,00 0,00 16,40352 -0,5011 
95 14 2013 5 0,40 0,20 6,50 0,00 0,00 16,47002 -0,48621 
96 14 2014 6 0,33 0,17 6,50 0,00 0,00 16,57615 -0,97573 
97 14 2015 6 0,33 0,17 6,50 0,00 0,00 16,82951 -0,36291 
98 14 2016 6 0,33 0,17 6,50 0,00 0,00 16,87836 -0,5174 
99 15 2010 5 0,40 0,00 7,29 0,00 1,00 21,0742 -0,12991 
100 15 2011 5 0,40 0,00 7,29 0,00 1,00 21,14957 -0,17226 
101 15 2012 5 0,40 0,00 7,29 0,00 1,00 21,14993 -0,2143 
102 15 2013 5 0,40 0,00 7,29 0,00 1,00 21,16869 -0,15612 
103 15 2014 6 0,50 0,00 7,29 0,00 1,00 21,05958 -0,23992 
104 15 2015 7 0,43 0,00 9,36 0,10 0,90 21,38536 0,143975 
105 15 2016 8 0,50 0,13 10,44 0,10 0,90 21,44549 -0,15908 
106 16 2010 4 0,50 0,00 8,39 0,41 0,00 18,27823 -0,00355 
107 16 2011 4 0,50 0,00 8,39 0,41 0,00 18,33818 -0,00321 
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108 16 2012 4 0,50 0,00 8,39 0,41 0,00 18,27823 -0,01087 
109 16 2013 4 0,50 0,00 8,39 0,44 0,00 18,33818 0,004828 
110 16 2014 4 0,50 0,00 8,39 0,17 0,00 18,11646 -0,28522 
111 16 2015 4 0,50 0,00 8,39 0,29 0,00 17,97541 -0,11268 
112 16 2016 4 0,50 0,00 8,39 0,67 0,00 17,9782 -0,04818 
113 17 2010 6 0,33 0,00 12,08 0,00 0,90 20,02299 -0,47867 
114 17 2011 6 0,33 0,00 12,08 0,00 0,90 20,19653 -0,49705 
115 17 2012 6 0,33 0,00 12,08 0,00 0,90 20,02299 -0,62671 
116 17 2013 6 0,33 0,00 11,24 0,00 0,90 20,19653 -0,58933 
117 17 2014 6 0,50 0,00 14,85 0,00 0,90 20,18782 -0,52684 
118 17 2015 6 0,50 0,00 14,85 0,00 0,90 20,24404 -0,64943 
119 17 2016 7 0,43 0,00 13,17 0,00 0,90 20,42886 -0,68711 
120 18 2010 3 0,33 0,00 2,52 0,00 0,00 17,61715 -0,57219 
121 18 2011 3 0,33 0,00 2,52 0,00 0,00 17,78878 -0,70586 
122 18 2012 3 0,33 0,00 2,52 0,00 0,00 17,78771 -0,46282 
123 18 2013 3 0,33 0,00 2,52 0,00 0,00 17,68795 -0,80882 
124 18 2014 3 0,33 0,00 11,79 0,00 0,00 17,96316 -0,52884 
125 18 2015 6 0,33 0,00 14,23 0,00 0,00 18,78499 -2,31876 
126 18 2016 6 0,33 0,00 14,23 0,00 0,00 18,8667 -0,65172 
127 19 2010 3 0,33 0,00 10,58 0,00 0,00 10,84638 -0,48526 
128 19 2011 3 0,33 0,00 10,58 0,00 0,00 16,20334 -0,65979 
129 19 2012 3 0,33 0,00 10,58 0,00 0,00 10,84638 0,064761 
130 19 2013 3 0,33 0,00 10,58 0,00 0,00 16,20334 2,02125 
131 19 2014 3 0,33 0,00 10,58 0,00 0,00 17,24174 -1,48649 
132 19 2015 3 0,33 0,00 10,58 0,00 0,00 17,18551 -1,33871 
133 19 2016 3 0,33 0,00 10,58 0,00 0,00 17,12845 -0,66399 
134 20 2010 6 0,67 0,00 7,81 0,00 0,00 16,31728 0,24434 
135 20 2011 6 0,67 0,00 7,81 0,00 0,00 16,73402 -0,90714 
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136 20 2012 6 0,67 0,00 7,81 0,00 0,00 16,97517 -0,86622 
137 20 2013 6 0,67 0,00 7,81 0,00 0,00 17,38157 -0,7479 
138 20 2014 6 0,67 0,00 7,81 0,00 0,00 17,53364 -0,52094 
139 20 2015 6 0,67 0,00 7,81 0,00 0,00 17,33466 -0,39035 
140 20 2016 6 0,67 0,00 7,81 0,00 0,00 17,5151 -0,78223 
141 21 2010 3 0,33 0,00 11,27 0,00 0,00 15,94193 -0,43045 
142 21 2011 3 0,33 0,00 11,27 0,00 0,00 16,24479 -0,43369 
143 21 2012 3 0,33 0,00 11,27 0,00 0,00 16,87841 -0,42831 
144 21 2013 3 0,33 0,00 11,27 0,00 0,00 17,57431 -0,20279 
145 21 2014 3 0,33 0,00 11,27 0,00 0,00 17,90529 0,016183 
146 21 2015 3 0,33 0,00 11,27 0,00 0,00 17,74212 -0,25635 
147 21 2016 3 0,33 0,00 11,27 0,00 0,00 17,73128 -0,10243 
148 22 2010 3 0,33 0,00 11,27 0,00 0,00 15,49772 -0,64193 
149 22 2011 3 0,33 0,00 11,27 0,00 0,00 15,56527 -0,50982 
150 22 2012 3 0,33 0,00 11,27 0,00 0,00 15,47327 -0,52717 
151 22 2013 3 0,33 0,00 11,27 0,00 0,00 15,53974 -0,51596 
152 22 2014 3 0,33 0,00 11,27 0,00 0,00 16,05381 -1,15382 
153 22 2015 3 0,33 0,00 11,27 0,00 0,00 15,80235 -0,01804 
154 22 2016 3 0,33 0,00 11,27 0,00 0,00 15,89944 -0,46707 
155 23 2010 4 0,25 0,75 13,23 0,00 0,00 15,91368 -0,1553 
156 23 2011 4 0,25 0,75 13,23 0,00 0,00 15,93698 -0,16498 
157 23 2012 4 0,25 0,75 13,23 0,00 0,00 15,91368 -0,93737 
158 23 2013 4 0,25 0,75 13,23 0,00 0,00 15,93698 -0,02898 
159 23 2014 4 0,25 0,75 13,23 0,00 0,00 15,96879 -0,16248 
160 23 2015 4 0,25 0,75 13,23 0,00 0,00 16,05718 -0,06627 
161 23 2016 4 0,25 0,75 13,23 0,00 0,00 16,14242 -0,04947 
162 24 2010 10 0,60 0,00 7,15 0,00 0,26 15,76741 -0,22673 
163 24 2011 10 0,60 0,00 7,15 0,00 0,26 15,83248 -0,26386 
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164 24 2012 10 0,60 0,00 7,15 0,00 0,26 15,62252 -0,47272 
165 24 2013 9 0,56 0,11 7,15 0,05 0,00 15,46286 -0,52915 
166 24 2014 9 0,67 0,11 7,15 0,00 0,00 15,10859 -0,56805 
167 24 2015 8 0,50 0,13 7,15 0,00 0,00 14,83765 -0,39556 
168 24 2016 8 0,63 0,13 7,15 0,05 0,00 15,21246 -0,68819 
169 25 2010 3 0,33 0,33 10,44 0,25 0,00 17,76332 -0,52158 
170 25 2011 3 0,33 0,33 10,44 0,25 0,00 17,96847 -0,69952 
171 25 2012 3 0,33 0,33 10,44 0,25 0,00 18,07699 -0,59174 
172 25 2013 3 0,33 0,33 16,77 0,00 0,00 18,21171 -0,62963 
173 25 2014 3 0,33 0,33 16,77 0,00 0,00 18,55321 -0,8008 
174 25 2015 3 0,33 0,33 16,77 0,00 0,00 18,66407 -0,72674 
175 25 2016 5 0,40 0,20 14,57 0,00 0,00 18,70121 -0,6341 
176 26 2010 3 0,33 0,33 7,57 0,00 0,00 17,84701 -0,49241 
177 26 2011 3 0,33 0,33 7,57 0,00 0,00 17,88564 -0,50172 
178 26 2012 3 0,33 0,33 7,57 0,00 0,00 17,88251 -0,52659 
179 26 2013 3 0,33 0,00 7,57 0,00 0,00 17,86946 -0,49038 
180 26 2014 3 0,33 0,00 7,57 0,00 0,00 17,83805 -0,60888 
181 26 2015 3 0,33 0,00 7,57 0,00 0,00 18,08439 -0,77256 
182 26 2016 3 0,33 0,00 7,57 0,00 0,00 18,06018 -0,59089 
183 27 2010 5 0,40 0,00 4,34 0,00 0,00 17,26195 -0,35104 
184 27 2011 5 0,40 0,00 4,34 0,00 0,00 17,34833 -0,43278 
185 27 2012 5 0,40 0,00 4,34 0,00 0,00 17,20587 -0,40367 
186 27 2013 5 0,40 0,00 4,34 0,00 0,00 17,21823 -0,43833 
187 27 2014 5 0,40 0,00 4,34 0,00 0,00 17,21823 -0,4567 
188 27 2015 5 0,60 0,00 4,34 0,00 0,00 17,27833 -0,51319 
189 27 2016 6 0,50 0,00 4,34 0,00 0,00 17,49134 -0,55011 
190 28 2010 7 0,43 0,00 11,08 0,00 1,00 21,64239 -0,5777 
191 28 2011 7 0,43 0,00 11,08 0,00 1,00 21,25603 -0,34405 
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192 28 2012 7 0,43 0,00 11,08 0,00 1,00 21,46357 -0,67524 
193 28 2013 7 0,43 0,00 11,08 0,00 1,00 21,63453 -0,66105 
194 28 2014 12 0,42 0,00 10,54 0,00 1,00 21,76547 -0,63156 
195 28 2015 8 0,50 0,00 9,70 0,00 1,00 21,78244 -0,71281 
196 28 2016 8 0,50 0,00 9,70 0,00 1,00 21,83363 -0,58743 
197 29 2010 3 0,33 0,00 3,21 0,00 0,00 15,35073 -0,68209 
198 29 2011 3 0,33 0,00 3,21 0,00 0,00 15,29945 -0,54992 
199 29 2012 3 0,33 0,00 3,21 0,00 0,00 15,36275 -0,76919 
200 29 2013 3 0,33 0,00 3,21 0,00 0,00 15,34791 -0,65784 
201 29 2014 3 0,33 0,00 3,21 0,00 0,00 15,38929 -0,63082 
202 29 2015 3 0,33 0,00 3,21 0,00 0,00 15,37231 -0,70825 
203 29 2016 3 0,33 0,00 3,21 0,00 0,00 15,42875 -0,73372 
204 30 2010 10 0,30 0,00 14,91 0,00 0,00 18,01961 -0,34083 
205 30 2011 10 0,30 0,00 14,91 0,00 0,00 18,14641 -0,42175 
206 30 2012 10 0,30 0,00 14,91 0,00 0,00 17,87436 -0,26955 
207 30 2013 10 0,30 0,00 14,91 0,00 0,00 18,36006 -0,62155 
208 30 2014 10 0,30 0,00 14,91 0,00 0,00 16,89267 -0,05298 
209 30 2015 10 0,30 0,00 14,91 0,00 0,00 17,18817 -0,25119 
210 30 2016 10 0,30 0,00 14,91 0,00 0,00 19,2601 -3,39368 
211 31 2010 6 0,33 0,00 10,70 0,00 0,00 14,22785 -0,37736 
212 31 2011 6 0,33 0,00 10,70 0,00 0,00 14,38225 -0,35186 
213 31 2012 6 0,33 0,00 10,70 0,00 0,00 14,04518 -0,39922 
214 31 2013 6 0,33 0,00 10,70 0,00 0,00 14,63389 -0,28551 
215 31 2014 6 0,33 0,00 10,70 0,00 0,00 12,42743 -0,46233 
216 31 2015 6 0,33 0,00 10,70 0,00 0,00 14,8461 -1,44327 
217 31 2016 6 0,33 0,00 10,70 0,00 0,00 15,13678 0,029969 
218 32 2010 9 0,50 0,13 6,14 0,00 0,00 14,72472 -0,21702 
219 32 2011 9 0,50 0,13 6,14 0,00 0,00 14,93573 -0,47823 
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220 32 2012 9 0,50 0,13 6,14 0,10 0,00 15,21399 -0,14503 
221 32 2013 9 0,50 0,13 6,14 0,10 0,00 15,46413 -0,45618 
222 32 2014 6 0,33 0,17 6,47 0,10 0,00 15,63127 -0,34314 
223 32 2015 5 0,40 0,20 6,30 0,10 0,00 15,28717 -0,38627 
224 32 2016 5 0,40 0,20 6,30 0,10 0,00 15,27146 -0,64177 
225 33 2010 10 0,60 0,00 7,15 0,00 0,26 15,76741 -0,22673 
226 33 2011 10 0,60 0,00 7,15 0,00 0,26 15,83248 -0,26386 
227 33 2012 10 0,60 0,00 7,15 0,00 0,26 15,62252 -0,47272 
228 33 2013 9 0,56 0,11 7,15 0,05 0,00 15,46286 -0,52915 
229 33 2014 9 0,67 0,11 7,15 0,00 0,00 15,10859 -0,56805 
230 33 2015 8 0,50 0,13 7,15 0,00 0,00 14,83765 -0,39556 
231 33 2016 8 0,63 0,13 7,15 0,05 0,00 15,21246 -0,68819 
232 34 2010 6 0,33 0,00 11,94 0,00 0,25 18,74563 -0,69925 
233 34 2011 6 0,33 0,00 11,94 0,00 0,25 18,79213 -0,5911 
234 34 2012 6 0,33 0,00 11,94 0,23 0,00 18,82375 -0,65516 
235 34 2013 6 0,17 0,00 11,94 0,24 0,00 18,88617 -0,72076 
236 34 2014 6 0,17 0,00 11,94 0,24 0,00 18,87806 -0,58327 
237 34 2015 5 0,40 0,20 12,55 0,24 0,00 18,92766 -0,40667 
238 34 2016 7 0,43 0,14 11,11 0,24 0,00 19,01418 -0,40843 
239 35 2010 6 0,33 0,17 14,41 0,00 0,00 16,19907 -0,50259 
240 35 2011 6 0,33 0,17 14,41 0,00 0,00 16,17993 -0,41064 
241 35 2012 6 0,33 0,17 14,41 0,00 0,00 16,13919 -0,39823 
242 35 2013 6 0,33 0,17 14,41 0,00 0,00 17,25333 -1,26803 
243 35 2014 6 0,33 0,17 14,41 0,00 0,00 17,01747 -0,28454 
244 35 2015 6 0,33 0,17 14,41 0,00 0,00 17,29626 -0,67102 
245 35 2016 6 0,33 0,17 14,41 0,00 0,00 17,4071 -0,34808 
 
 
